A New Theory of Social Control by Tittle, Charles R.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 80 Issue 4 
1982 
A New Theory of Social Control 
Charles R. Tittle 
Florida Atlantic University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charles R. Tittle, A New Theory of Social Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 857 (1982). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol80/iss4/39 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
A NEW THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
Charles R. Tittle* 
NORMS, DEVIANCE, AND SOCIAL CONTROL: CONCEPTUAL MAT-
TERS. By Jack P. Gibbs. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1981. 
Pp. 190. $25. 
A perennial problem for social scientists is that almost everything 
they study is ill-defined. Everyone knows, for instance, that some 
individuals have more power than others, that people differ in hon-
esty, and that people reflect various degrees of "tightness" in their 
associations with each other. Yet, "power," "honesty," "group cohe-
sion," and even "group" defy conceptualizations that simultaneously 
reflect the essence of social reality, are empirically applicable in re-
search, and can be agreed upon by most practicing social scientists. 
Indeed, almost every social science concept has been defined in nu-
merous and diverse ways. Moreover, the definitions not only diverge 
but often tum out to be so vague that they cannot be used in cumula-
tive research or theory building. 
Little wonder, then, that so much of the social science literature is 
devoted to problems of communication: Untold pages of print are 
wasted arguing about what was said, what was meant by what was 
said, and what the evidence implies for various vaguely conceived 
theories. In short, most of the time social scientists do not know 
what they are talking about because they do not bother to make 
their conceptualizations clear or to consider all the ramifications of 
the concepts that they explicitly or implicitly embrace. What is even 
more distressing is that most social scientists rarely worry about this 
situation. Probably the only time they truly agonize over the inade-
quacy of definitions is when someone so convincingly exposes a con-
ceptual muddle that it can simply no longer be ignored. 
This is exactly what Professor Jack Gibbs has done in his latest 
book, Norms, Deviance, and Social Control. He shows us by logic 
and example that all of the currently popular definitions or concep-
tualizations of social control are either impossibly broad or absurdly 
narrow, always vague, and usually empirically inapplicable. It is a 
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compelling object lesson to see a list of twelve to fifteen definitions of 
some concept lined up next to each other. In the case of social con-
trol, we find definitions ranging from that of E.A. Ross, who thought 
of social control as practically anything that influences human be-
havior, all the way to the contemporary conventional conception 
that identifies social control as "actions that counteract deviance." 
The conventional conceptualization - which Gibbs calls the pro-
phylactic approach - is imprecise because it does not specify which 
social actions fall under the rubric of "social control." Nor does it 
spell out who must initiate such actions. Most scholars simply as-
sume that punishing actions imposed by recognized governmental 
authorities qualify; however, both "punishing" and "recognized gov-
ernmental authorities" are subject to varying interpretations. In ad-
dition, this conceptualization ignores the question of intent and 
implies that only successful counteraction of deviance qualifies as 
social control. But the main problem with the popular prophylactic 
definition is that it assumes an adequate preexisting conceptualiza-
tion of "deviance." If social control is supposed to counteract devi-
ance, scholars must be able to identify what is deviant behavior 
before they can speak of controlling it. 
Yet, deviance is itself one of those concepts that has no agreed-
upon definition, with conceptualizations ranging from those set forth 
by proponents of the labeling perspective to those that might be 
termed "moralistic." If one takes the approach of the labelists, devi-
ance is indicated in particular instances by official negative reaction 
to some behavior. But applying this definition requires answers to 
questions about who must react, in what way, and with what results. 
Social control then becomes little more than a tautology. A more 
popular way of conceptualizing deviance is by reference to "norms," 
but this in tum requires an adequate definition of norms. Gibbs 
demonstrates that typical normative concepts, although less diver-
gent than concepts of deviance or social control, nevertheless require 
specifications about who must "share evaluations of conduct," and 
how many group members must agree in order to qualify something 
as a norm. There are also problems concerning variables (such as 
age, sex, or circumstances) that influence whether something is ac-
ceptable or not, with the result that one has to wonder if there is a 
general norm about any behavior. Moreover, those who set forth 
definitions of norms in terms of evaluations of conduct fail to indi-
cate how one is to take into account differences in the power of vari-
ous "evaluators." 
From almost any perspective, social control is a vague idea; it is 
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vaguer still because the component concepts with which it is conven-
tionally defined are themselves vague and imprecise, two steps re-
moved. Clearly, then, social control cries out for recon-
ceptualization. 
Having laid this groundwork, Gibbs then goes on to propose a 
new conceptualization of social control. He believes that it over-
comes the definitional problems of other approaches, provides an in-
teresting and largely unexplored subject matter, and has great 
theoretical potential. Succinctly, the new conceptualization states 
that social control is any attempt by one party to manipulate the 
behavior of a second party through a third party by any means other 
than a normal chain of command. Within this general definition, 
but without pretense of being exhaustive, he distinguishes five major 
types of social control, each with numerous subtypes. The five major 
types are referential, vicarious, allegative, modulative, and preclu-
sive social control. In assessing Gibbs's conceptualization, some de-
tail here becomes unavoidable. 
Referential social control is said to involve attempts by one party 
to manipulate a second party's behavior by referring to a third party. 
Gibbs identifies eight subtypes of referential social control, and illus-
trates each with concrete examples. For instance, commensalistic so-
cial control occurs when a child attempts to retrieve his candy from a 
sibling by threatening to tell their mother. The reference to a third 
party here assumes common respect for, or fear of, the third party. 
In the case of juridical social control, someone (such as an attorney) 
tries to manipulate the behavior of a judge by referring to the behav-
ior of other judges in previous cases. Similarly, a politician may 
practice associational social control to gamer votes by implying that 
he agrees with a popular president. And even whole groups of peo-
ple may qualify as practitioners (first party participants) or recipients 
(second party participants) of social control, as in the example of 
authoritative social control where the officials of a government 
agency try to influence the population of smokers or potential smok-
ers by referring to the surgeon general's report on the hazards of 
cigarette smoking. 
Vicarious social control occurs when a first party tries to influ-
ence the behavior of a second party by punishing, rewarding, or rec-
tifying a third party's behavior. Gibbs mentions four subtypes: 
deterrent, hypocritical, advancive, and placative social control. For 
instance, a judge (first party) practices deterrent social control when 
he sentences somebody (third party) to prison in the belief that this 
will generally deter the population of potential offenders (second 
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party). The same judge may exhibit hypocritical social control by 
sentencing an unpopular defendant to a long prison term in order to 
win public support for an election campaign. Or he might engage in 
placative social control by sentencing a person to be hanged to sat-
isfy the demands of a mob. In all such instances of vicarious social 
control, action is taken against one party for the purpose of influenc-
ing somebody not directly involved in the actio.n. 
The third subtype, called allegative social control, occurs when a 
first party alleges something to a third party about a second party in 
the expectation that the third party will influence the second party's 
behavior. Gibbs illustrates seven subtypes of allegative social con-
trol. Examples include: (1) appellative social control, when a child 
tattles to his mother that his brother has taken some candy in the 
hope that she will punish the brother or at least get the candy back; 
(2) adversarial social control, when a plaintiff testifies that a defend-
ant has been negligent, expecting the court to order payment of dam-
ages; and (3) ameliorative social control, when a father tells a 
psychiatrist that his daughter attempted suicide in order to get the 
psychiatrist to employ therapy. 
Modulative social control is a subtype that involves attempts by a 
first party to influence a second party by using the presumed influ-
ence of a third party on the second but without exclusive reliance on 
allegations about the second party or references to the third in com-
munications with the second. Five subtypes are identified, but they 
are somewhat more difficult to understand than the previous exam-
ples. Identificational social control occurs when a youth director ar-
ranges a visit by a popular athlete on the assumption that, as a result, 
young people in that area will participate more fully in the program. 
In this instance, the youth director is trying to manipulate the youths 
through the popular athlete, but he neither makes allegations about 
the youths to the athlete nor exhorts the youths by directly referring 
to the athlete. A second example is isolative social control, where a 
judge incarcerates a youth to neutralize his bad influence on other 
youths in the area. Here the judge (first party) tries to influence the 
behavior of the area youths (second party) through a third party (in-
carcerated youth) without directly referring to the incarcerated youth 
in communications with the other youths and without making alle-
gations to the incarcerated youth about the area youths. 
The final type of social control that Gibbs identifies is preclusive 
social control, a type that is even more complex than modulative 
social control, particularly since it functions much as a residual cate-
gory. Preclusive social control is said to involve using a third party 
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to gather information about a second party, directing a third party to 
use coercion to limit the behavior of the second party to certain con-
texts, or taking any action that can facilitate manipulation of the sec-
ond party through the third. One subtype, informative social 
control, occurs when a police official encourages an informant to 
provide information about subversive activity that can later be used 
for manipulating the behavior of the subversives. Preemptive social 
control occurs when a company owner inquires into the background 
of an applicant for employment so that employment can be refused 
if the applicant is found dishonest or unreliable. Exclusionary social 
control is practiced by legislators when they enact laws excluding 
communists from the country. In all of these examples, the first 
party may be planning to exercise social control but is not actually 
doing so since there is no immediate intent to manipulate the behav-
ior of the second party through the use of the third. Yet, Gibbs clas-
sifi.es such actions as fitting his definition of social control because 
they are taken with an eye to eventually altering behavior. 
The new conceptualization identifies human conduct that is 
clearly social because it always involves at least three social entities. 
It qualifies as a form of control because it involves attempts to im-
pose the will of one social entity upon another. Furthermore, social 
control is set in a general classification of control that allows it to be 
distinguished from material control as well as from other forms of 
biological control. Indeed, social control here comes to be a subtype 
of extemalistic, human, animate control to be definitely separated 
from intemalistic or directorial control. Thus, Gibbs hopes to avoid 
many problems of other conceptualizations, which ignore the exist-
ence of a general scheme of control phenomena. In particular, his 
definition bypasses definitional difficulties encountered by others 
who have tried to think of social control with reference to norms or 
deviance. 
The new conceptualization is justified as being freer from defini-
tional ambiguities than previous ones and as identifying a unique 
subject matter. Nevertheless, one of its strengths is that many of the 
phonemena typically studied by students of "social control" are sub-
sumed within the scheme. For instance, most proponents of the pro-
phylactic approach to social control show particular interest in the 
work of agents of the law and in the legal machinery of sanctioning. 
Within Gibb's scheme, much of the work of legal agents also quali-
fies as social control, especially those acts aimed at general deter-
rence. Curiously, however, this conceptualization does not treat 
direct actions by police or judges aimed at specific deterrence as so-
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cial control. When one party uses coercion or imposes a sanction on 
another party, it qualifies as proximate, not social, control. Hence, 
many criminologists are going to be surprised to learn that all their 
work concerning sanctions really has little to do with the new ap-
proach to social control. This is unfortunate and a little confusing. 
In addition, it points up one of several potential difficulties in apply-
ing the definition. 
The most important difficulty is that social control networks may 
be contained within other social control networks so that activities or 
actions may qualify or not qualify as social control, depending upon 
where one chooses to make a cutting point. Consider the case of a 
judge who sentences a felon on the assumption that the felon will be 
deterred from future crime. Presumably this is proximate rather 
than social control, but the sentence may be regarded as an instruc-
tion to prison officials (or even to the general public), which directs 
them to do something to influence the felon. This would qualify it as 
modulative social control. On the other hand, action by prison offi-
cials designed to manipulate the future behavior of the felon may be 
only proximate control, even though it is the continuation of a se-
quence of social control in which the instructions of a judge are im-
plemented. More confusing still, the judge's sentence may be 
excluded as an instance of social control if his action is interpreted as 
an instruction to prison officials but is regarded as a simple resort to 
a chain of command. 
In my mind, there is no reason why all instances of sanctioning 
by legal agents could not qualify as a special kind of social control in 
the Gibbsian scheme since they always involve at least a general ef-
fort by a first party (such as a legislature) to influence conduct of a 
population by the use of a third party (police, judges, prison offi-
cials). Yet, to broaden the scope of definition, as I have suggested is 
possible, opens the door to the very kind of generality that has made 
previous definitions of social control imprecise. Still, the new con-
ceptualization, even in its narrowed form, does handle most of what 
has popularly become known as social control, even those things that 
Gibbs demonstrates are hopelessly mired in definitional imprecision. 
All efforts to control deviance may be social control, provided the 
first party acts on the assumption that the behavior to be manipu-
lated is deviant. Similarly, behaviors that particular actors try to 
manipulate may have a normative quality and the methods used in 
manipulation may acquire normative characteristics. Most of the 
things sociologists call informal social control- gossip, status deni-
gration, and the like - are also subsumable under Gibb's model. 
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But the new approach goes far beyond conventional ideas, particu-
larly by encompassing activities like advertising, propaganda, and 
administrative actions. 
In the end, of course, definitions are arbitrary and essentially use-
less unless they point the way to an understanding of some interest-
ing realm of human behavior. The crucial vehicle for that 
understanding is theory. A definition only identifies a subject mat-
ter; it does not explain it. Because Gibbs is fully aware of this, he 
attempts to spell out some theoretical postulates and to set his ap-
proach within the theoretical parameters that have most often char-
acterized the field of "social control." In particular, he formulates 
hypotheses about the sociocultural conditions under which one type 
of social control will prevail over other types, and attempts to justify 
them theoretically. Unfortunately, this is the weakest part of the 
book. Several of the arguments simply do not ring true (Is it really 
the case, for example, that in situations of high normative consensus 
all requests by one member to another will be honored?). 
In my opinion, Gibbs has sold his own product short. Although 
his suggested theoretical guideposts are unexciting1 the scheme he 
has formulated is a veritable gold mine of provocative questions. I, 
for one, can hardly think about the examples he discusses without 
finding hypotheses and rudimentary explanations running through 
my head. For instance, the question of when social control will be 
more effective than proximate control jumps right out, suggesting the 
hypothesis that social control will always be more effective because it 
minimizes the necessity for social and psychological face-saving de-
fense mechanisms. From this beginning one could begin to formu-
late a theory of social influence. Moreover, the invitation to discover 
and explain the conditions under which one form of social control 
dominates another is powerful. 
In short, although the scheme may not live up to the author's 
description of it as "the final definition of social control," it does 
have much potential. In fact, I suspect that of all the intellectual 
contributions Gibbs has made (and there have been many), this one 
will be the most significant. This is not to say that there are no 
problems with the conceptualization. The confusion and definitional 
ambiguity surrounding the so-called preclusive types of social con-
trol, the difficulty in measuring or inf erring intent, the exclusion of 
chains of command, the inability easily to incorporate direct acts of 
sanctioning, the failure to deal with situations where control is ef-
fected through third parties but not intended, the neglect of distinc-
tions between institutionalized and spontaneous social control, and 
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the thinness of the suggested theoretical arguments all suggest that 
work remains to be done. Nevertheless, Gibbs is certainly on target 
in exposing definitional problems and he has identified a domain of 
study sorely in need of attention. The next step is for other scholars 
to undertake the theoretical and empirical work necessary to make 
social control a rich specialty. 
